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Abstract
The US economy has become more stable. At the same time, US firms have become
more volatile. I present the evidence and I propose a common explanation, based on the
idea that goods markets have become more competitive. Competition between firms
magnifies the eﬀects of idiosyncratic productivity shocks: This can explain the rise in
firm volatility. On the other hand, for given nominal adjustment costs, competitive
pressures will induce firms to increase the frequency of their price adjustments. As a
result, the economy will be more resilient to aggregate demand shocks. My calibration
suggests that competitive pressures may have reduced the impact of demand shocks by
40%.
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The decline in aggregate volatility was first described by Kim and Nelson (1999) and
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000). Both papers conclude that the decline happened in the
first quarter of 1984. Blanchard and Simon (2001) interpret the same data as a downward
trend in the post-war period, interrupted by a period of high instability in the 1970s.
Stock and Watson (2002) examine the quantitative importance of various explanations for
the increased stability of the economy, and reach mixed conclusions: “Taken together, we
estimate that the moderation in volatility is attributable to a combination of improved
policy (20-30%), identifiable good luck in the form of productivity and commodity price
shocks (20-30%), and other unknown forms of good luck that manifest themselves as smaller
reduced form forecast errors (40-60%).”
I propose an explanation for these “unknown forms of good luck.” I argue that the
US economy has become structurally more stable because goods markets have become
more competitive. This explanation is appealing because the decline in aggregate volatility
coincided with a large increase in volatility at the firm level, as I show below1. Competition
increases the volatility of firms because it magnifies the eﬀects of idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. I study the implications of this hypothesis in a standard macroeconomic model with
nominal rigidities. Since it is costly to set the wrong price in a competitive environment,
firms will increase the frequency of their price adjustments when competition increases. As
a result, the eﬀects of nominal spending shocks will be smaller and shorter-lived.
The decline in aggregate volatility is, by now, a well-known fact. The increase in firm
volatility is less well known. It was first pointed out in Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu
(2001) for stock returns, and in Chaney, Gabaix, and Philippon (2002) and Comin and Mu-
lani (2003) for real variables (sales, employment, investment..). Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel,
and Xu (2001) show that the volatility of individual stocks was multiplied by more than two
between the 1960s and the 1990s. The increase in firm volatility is interesting because it can
help us discriminate among competing explanations for the decrease in aggregate volatility.
On the other hand, one can wonder why the two phenomenons ought to be related: after
all, these are just two trends that happen to go in diﬀerent directions. There seems to
be a deeper connection however, both across industries in the US, and across countries.
1For evidence that the integration of product and financial markets has rendered modern economies more
competitive, see Blanchard and Philippon (2002) and the references therein.
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Chaney, Gabaix, and Philippon (2002) show that, controlling for past volatility (pre-1984),
the current (post-1984) volatility of an industry is negatively related to the increase in firm
volatility within this industry. Hamao, Mei, and Xu (2003) report that, contrary to the
US, idiosyncratic risk has been falling in Japan in the 1990’s, precisely at the time when
aggregate risk was increasing2.
I present the empirical evidence in section 1. In section 2, I introduce a simple model
of firm and aggregate volatility. I propose a calibration in section 3 and I conclude by
discussing the predictions of the model as well as some alternative explanations.
1 Evidence
Figure 1 shows that the US economy has become more stable while US firms have become
more volatile. Aggregate volatility is the standard deviation of the annual log-growth rate
of real GDP, using quarterly data. Similarly, firm volatility is the standard deviation of
log(salest) − log (salest−4). I measure firm volatility using COMPUSTAT over the period
1965-2001. The composition of the sample changed over this period: Firms in the recent
part of the sample are on average younger, and operate in diﬀerent sectors of activity, than
firms in the early part of the sample. The results presented in figure 1 are conditional on
age and sectorial composition: In other words, I compare the volatility of a 10 years old
firm in retail trade during the period 1990-1995 to the volatility of a 10 years old firm in
retail trade during the period 1970-1975. Between the first half and the second half of the
sample period (1965-1980 versus 1986-2001), aggregate volatility went down from 2.6% to
1.5%, while firm volatility went up from 14% to 25%.
To construct these estimates, I start from the complete COMPUSTAT sample. I drop
firms for which I do not have at least 20 quarterly observations. I subtract the median
growth rate in each quarter to control for variations in sales growth common to all firms
(aggregate shocks)3. I then compute the volatility of each firm within each window of 5
years. Finally, I run
volatijτ = αj + βagei,τ + γτ
2More generally, Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) show that idiosyncratic risk relative to aggregate risk is
much larger in rich countries than in developing countries.
3 I also winsorize the log growth rates of sales at 5% and 95% within each quarter to remove the influence
of outliers.
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where i is firm, j is sector and τ = 65− 70, 71− 75.. Figure 1 shows the time dummies γτ
plus the average volatility in the initial period. The results of the regression are in Table
1. I also made some robustness checks. The results do not change if I control for firm
size (measured by deflated total assets) instead of firm age, or if I run median regressions
instead of OLS.
2 A model of firm and aggregate volatility
The purpose of this section is to show how the textbook business cycle model with nominal
rigidities can be used to study the eﬀects of competition of firm and aggregate volatility.
In doing so, I make only the required modifications: First, I introduce idiosyncratic shocks,
and second, I let the firms choose the frequency of price adjustments endogenously. The
benefit of this approach is its parsimony. The cost is that the resulting model will have
the same well-known problems as the benchmark one (see Woodford (2003) and Bils and
Klenow (2002)), and one should keep in mind this caveat when interpreting the quantitative
results.
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of consumers-workers, who maximize:
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Consumers receive labor incomeWtLt, the aggregate profits of the firms Πt and the interest
payments Rt on their real bond holdings Bt. They hold real money balances MtPt . The
real bond is in zero net supply and all aggregate uncertainty comes from the nominal
money supply, which is random and exogenous. Mt needs not be interpreted as a monetary
shock: For instance, shocks to consumers’ impatience to consume would enter the aggregate
demand equation in similar way, as we will see below in equation (3) (see Woodford (2003)
for a discussion). For simplicity, I shall continue to refer to Mt as the money supply shock.
The only non-standard feature of this model is the presence of idiosyncratic productivity
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The consumption of Cit physical units of good i delivers the same utility as the consumption
of ZitCit
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units of good j. The processes Zit are exogenous, and conveniently normalized.
Goods markets operate under monopolistic competition, labor is the only factor of
production and its marginal productivity (in physical units) is constant and normalized to
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I assume, as in Calvo (1983), that firms have a probability (1− λ) to reset their price in
any given period. Let Qit be the price chosen by firm i at time t if it gets the chance to
reset its price. The FOC yields:
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To derive this formula, I have used the independence of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.
Equation (1) shows that idiosyncratic shocks introduce a firm specific discount factor. In
particular, if Zit is mean reverting, the implied discounting is not geometric and firms with
diﬀerent shocks at time t will set diﬀerent prices. I assume that the idiosyncratic shocks
follow the process
log (Zit) = ρz log (Zit) + νit+1
where ν is iid and normally distributed N (0, σz). In this case,
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However, it turns out that, in the data, the process Z has a unit root: ρz ≈ 14. This
simplifies a lot the algebra, since it implies that
Et
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δ = exp
Ã
(θ − 1)2 σ2z
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!
I therefore obtain a simple generalization of the usual formula. Using lower cases to denote
log deviations from steady state, the price setting equation is:
qt
1− βλδ = Et
" ∞X
t0=t
(βλδ)t
0−t (wt0 + pt0)
#
(2)
Note that, despite the idiosyncratic shocks, all the firms still choose to set the same price,
and the price level evolves according to:
pt = λpt−1 + (1− λ) qt
Technology and labor supply decisions imply that wt =
³
1
φ
+ 1
σ
´
yt, where σ is the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. I consider the limit economy described in Woodford (2003),
where real balances amount to a small fraction of GDP, and I obtain for the demand side
of the economy:
mt − pt = ηyyt − ηiit
yt = Et [yt+1]− σ (it −Et [pt+1 − pt])
I have introduced the usual parameters: ηi is the semi-elasticity of money demand with
respect to the interest rate, ηy is the income elasticity of money demand and σ is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. I combine these two equations into:
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¸
= 0 (3)
4This suggests that the distribution of Z in steady state should have an infinite variance. Empirically,
mean reversion is entirely due to the life cycle of firms: young firms tend to have positively auto-correlated
growth rate (ρ > 1) while old firms have negatively correlated growth rates. In any case, both young and
old are very close to following random walks over the short run.
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As noted above, the disturbance term σ
ηi
mt in equation (3) needs not be interpreted as
a monetary shock: Shocks to consumers’ impatience to consume would enter the aggre-
gate demand equation in a similar way. I assume that mt follows an AR(2) process with
persistence ρ = (ρ1, ρ2) and normally distributed shocks εt with variance σ
2
 :
mt = ρ1mt−1 + ρ2mt−2 + εt
Figure 2 shows the impulse response of the economy to a persistent shock ρ = (1.58,−0.724)5.
The price level initially increases less than one for one with the nominal shock, so that both
real balances and real output increase. Over time, the shock disappears and prices adjust.
As is well known, the (real) volatility of this economy increases with λ. When λ = 0, the
volatility is also 0. When λ = 1, prices are fixed and yt moves with (mt,mt−1). I assume
that firms choose λ optimally to maximize profits net of nominal adjustment costs:
E [Vi (λi) |λ, ρ, σε, δ, θ]− (1− λi)× z
1− β
Each price change costs z. Note that E denotes expectations over the ergodic distribution
of firm and aggregate variables: Firms choose λ knowing in which economy they are going
to operate but before the realization of any shock6. Using a second order approximation,
one finds that profit losses due to lack of price adjustment are given by
θ − 1
2
(pit − pt − wt)2
Competition (θ) increases the curvature of the profit function and, therefore, the cost of devi-
ating from the optimal price. The loss function Λ (λ, x ; ρ, σε, δ) = E
h
(pi − p− w)2 |λ, ρ, δ, σε, λi = x
i
plays a crucial role in the model. ∂Λ
∂x
measures the marginal loss from an increase in nominal
rigidity. Figure 3 shows the shape of the function Λ (λ, x) for calibrated values of (δ, ρ, σε):
Losses from lack of price adjustment are convex and increasing in x, and increasing in λ.
It is not a-priori obvious whether Λ (λ, x) should be increasing or decreasing in λ. When λ
decreases, w becomes less volatile (real volatility decreases), while p becomes more volatile
(nominal volatility increases): The net eﬀect is, in general, ambiguous. In fact, it depends
5These values are estimated using the historical series of detrended GDP, as explained below.
6This is the conceptually correct way to think about the choice of λ. It is better than to assume that the
economy start in the non-stochastic steady state (p0 = 0) and to compute the NPV of profit losses. Here, I
assume that the economy starts in the stochastic steady state, i.e. the state variables of the first period are
drawn from the ergodic distribution.
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on the real rigidity of the economy. When λ = 0, w ≡ 0 and p ≡ m, the volatility of p+ w
is equal to the volatility of m. When λ = 1, we see that w ≡ 1+φ
φ
y and p ≡ 0. Whether
the volatility of the nominal marginal cost is higher or lower when λ = 1 than when λ = 0
depends, among other things, on the elasticity of labor supply.
The final step is to find the equilibrium choice of λ. Since λi is chosen non cooperatively,
I define:
λ˜ (λ, δ, ρ, σε, θ,z) = argmin
x
½
Λ (λ, x ; ρ, σε, δ) + (1− x)× 2
θ − 1z
¾
(4)
A particular λ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if:
λ˜ (λ, δ, ρ, σε, θ,z) = λ
This gives us λ (ρ, δ, σε, θ,z). If if were not for δ, it would be obvious from equation (4)
that ∂λ˜
∂θ
< 0. The issue is that δ depends on θ and that Λ depends on δ in a complicated
way. In my benchmark calibration however, I find that δ is always very close to 1 and that
changes in θ have a very small impact on aggregate dynamics conditional on λ. As long
as ∂λ˜
∂λ
< 1, we will also have ∂λ
∂θ
< 07, and an increase in competition in the goods market
will lead to a decrease in price stickiness and real aggregate volatility. I now turn to the
quantitative investigation of this mechanism.
3 Calibration
The idea behind the calibration is simple. I start from an economy with low competi-
tive pressures (θ = θ0) and I calibrate the idiosyncratic shocks Zit to match the empirical
volatility of firms’ sales before 1980. Keeping everything else constant, I increase θ to θ¯
by exactly the amount necessary to explain the increase in volatility at the firm level. I
then compute the new equilibrium, in particular the new parameter λ
¡
ρ, σε,z, θ¯
¢
, and I
compare the volatility of the new economy to the volatility of the old economy.
The baseline parameters of the model are φ = 4 for the elasticity of labor supply and
σ = 1 for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (as in the RBC literature), θ0 = 4 as in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and λ0 = .75 implying that prices are changed on average
once a year. I choose the demand shock to explain the historical time series of HP-filtered
7 In particular, this will be true as long as the economy does not have multiple equilibria.
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real GDP: Given the values of (φ, λ0), I solve for ρ and mt such that the model implies the
correct path of detrended GDP over the post-war period, and the persistence of the money
shock assumed by the agents when making their forecasts is the same as in the data8.
The real sales of firm i at time t are given by
yit + pit − pt = ct + (θ − 1) zit − (θ − 1) (pit − pt)
I calibrate the volatility of zit to match the volatility of firms in the first half of the sample,
given the initial value for θ. Note that this is not completely straightforward since aggre-
gate and firm dynamics are jointly determined: δ depends on the volatility of z while the
predicted volatility of sales depends on all the aggregate dynamics through the volatility
of pit − pt. I calibrate σz = 4% to fit an initial firm volatility of 14%. I now have all the
parameters of the economy plus a series of aggregate shocks mt.
ρ σε ηi ηy θ0 φ σ λ0 σz
(1.58,−0.724) 0.86% 1 1 4 4 1 .75 4%
I then choose the nominal adjustment costs to be consistent with my calibration of the
old economy: z is such that λ (ρ, σε, δθ0 ,z, θ0) = .75. To invert this formula, I need to
simulate the mapping Λ (λ, x) defined above and shown in figure 3. To match the increase
in sales growth volatility from 14% to 25%, I estimate θ¯ to be 5.7. The Nash equilibrium
choices are given by9:
λ˜ (λ0, δθ0 , ρ, σε, θ0,z) = λ0
λ˜
¡
λ¯, δθ¯, ρ, σε, θ¯,z
¢
= λ¯
Figure 4 shows graphically how the Nash equilibria are computed. The top line represents
λ˜ (λ, ρ, σε, δθ0 ,z, θ0) as a function of λ, while the lower line plots the same function when
8This amounts to looking for a fixed point. Make a guess for the persistence of the shocks, say ρ0 =
ρ01, ρ02

. Given this guess and the other parameters (φ, λ, θ), solve the model with rational expectation. The
solution for output is
yt = αy

ρ0

pt−1 + γy

ρ0

. [mt,mt−1]
pt = αp

ρ0

pt−1 + γp

ρ0

. [mt,mt−1]
One can invert these equations and solve for mt as a function of {yt−i}i≥0. In general, the persistence ρˆ0 of
the implied series of mt is not equal to ρ0. Start over using ρ1 = ρˆ0 until convergence. See King and Rebelo
(1999).
9Recall that δ depends on θ (holding σz constant). In practice, this does not matter much since δθ0 =
1.0072 and δθ¯ = 1.0177.
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θ = θ¯. I estimate λ¯ = .585. The dynamics of the high competition economy are compared
with the ones of the low competition economy in figure 5 (for GDP) and 6 (for prices). The
volatility of real GDP is 40% lower in the competitive economy. The model also predict a
drop in inflation persistence, from 0.7 to 0.65.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
My calibration suggests that competitive pressures in the goods market may have reduced
the impact of demand10 shocks11 on the economy by 40%.
The model predicts an increase in the frequency of price adjustments and a decrease in
the persistence of inflation. I estimated a new value of λ of .585 if the true value before 1980
was .75: this would imply an average duration of 7.2 months in the mid-1990s. Bils and
Klenow (2002) report a dramatic decrease in inflation persistence, from 0.63 when estimated
over the long sample (1959 to 2000, Table 6) down to 0.2 during 1995-2000. The model
makes the right qualitative prediction, but it cannot explain such a large drop in inflation
persistence without a change in the process for demand shocks.
Several caveats should be kept in mind12. First, competition is hard to measure. There is
simply no credible way to estimate the level of markups13. There is, however, some evidence
supporting the thesis of an increase in competition: Blanchard and Philippon (2002) report
that barriers to entrepreneurship (in the US) have been declining since the late 1970’s, and
that openness to trade has been increasing since the 1960’s. Both evolutions should have
10Nominal rigidities amplify demand shocks, but they also tend to dampen supply shocks. The competition
hypothesis, however, does not need to rely on the sticky price model to explain the facts: Most models of
counter-cyclical markups (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for a review of these models) would predict
diverging trends for macro and firm volatilities. Essentially, this will be true as long as the elasticity of the
markup with respect to aggregate shocks decreases with the degree of competition. A potential advantage
of models of counter-cyclical desired markups is that, unlike the sticky price model, they amplify all shocks,
not only the demand shocks.
11As explained above, the interpretations for the shocks include money demand and supply shocks, as well
as shocks to consumers’ impatience to consume.
12The model is such that labor productivity is constant over time. However, I do not view this as a
serious issue since it is well known that labor hoarding and capacity utilization create biases in short run
estimates of labor productivity and TFP. Note also that models of endogenous capacity utilization (see King
and Rebelo (1999)) predict that a decline in output volatility should be accompanied by a similar decline
in the volatility of measured TFP, irrespective of where the decline in volatility is coming from. In other
words, if I augmented this simple model with variable utilization, it would predict the observed decline in
the volatility of the Solow residual.
13The profit rate is not a good proxy since product market rents can be appropriated by labor (see
Blanchard and Philippon (2002) for a discussion and some evidence)
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increased the degree of competition in the goods market.
A second caveat is that there is no consistent data to test the prediction that the fre-
quency of price changes has increased over time: The new data set of Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2003) covers only the period 1988-2003.
Finally, keeping the process for aggregate shocks constant, models with sticky prices
tend to explain the decrease in real volatility by an increase in price level volatility. The
data show, however, that both inflation and real output have become less volatile. To
reconcile the model with the data, one would need to assume that monetary policy has also
become more eﬃcient. While this explanation is plausible (see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2000)), it is outside the scope of this paper. An intriguing question for future research is
how changes in competition aﬀects optimal monetary policy.
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Method
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
Variables
1965 to 1970 (omitted) 0 0 0 0 0 0
1971 to 1975 0.031309 4.84 0.032308 5.12 0.044375 5.83
1976 to 1980 0.018945 3.01 0.020733 3.34 0.038201 5.15
1981 to 1985 0.070105 12.68 0.0766 14.13 0.074074 11.4
1986 to 1990 0.106427 19.8 0.112473 21.4 0.099571 15.76
1991 to 1995 0.125278 24.08 0.134452 26.22 0.105331 17.23
1996 to 2001 0.151249 28.82 0.153987 29.88 0.150894 24.48
Industry
Age
R2
N
log(age) 40 age dummies
18343
0.1932
18343
0.2608
18343
log(age)
Time Dummies
Controls
1-digit (7)
Table 1: Regressions of Volatility of Firm's Sales on Controls and Time dummies. The first 2
regressions use OLS. The last one uses absolute deviation from the median (quantile regression).
Source: Compustat.
ols ols median
2-digits (48) 1-digit(7)
Aggregate Volatility is volatility of log growth rate of GDP. Residual Firm Volatility is volatility of log growth rate of sales, net of aggregate shocks
and controlling for sector and firm age. Data: NIPA and COMPUSTAT.
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Fig. 1: Volatilities estimated over windows of 5 years
Fiscal Year
A
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
V
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
 Residual Firm Volatility  Aggregate Volatility
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
.1
.15
.2
.25
.3
.01
.02
.03
.04





